Date: From July 10, 1940, to October 31, 1940
Definition: A series of aerial bombings made by the Germans over British cities
during World War II.
Significance: The Battle of Britain, designed to completely demoralize the
British by destroying the nation's industrial and military infrastructure, was
the first major battle to be fought almost entirely in the air.
Background
By the end of June, 1940, the German army
had conquered almost every country that had opposed it. Only Great Britain,
protected by the English Channel, remained in the fight, even though it had
lost much of its army on the Continent in fruitless support of its allies.
Thus, when German chancellor Adolf Hitler offered peace to Britain, much of the
world thought his offer would be accepted. When Britain refused, Hitler issued
orders for an invasion, a vital preliminary to which would be the elimination
of the British Royal Air Force (RAF).
Protagonists
To carry out the destruction of the RAF,
the German Luftwaffe had 1,050 fighter aircraft and 1,600 bombers, based on
airfields from Norway to the Atlantic coast of France. The actual number of
these craft that were serviceable and available for operations varied from day
to day. Against these, the RAF could field 550 single-seat fighters immediately
available and serviceable, in about fifty squadrons stationed on airfields from
the north of Scotland to the west of England. The figures of available aircraft
for both sides varied as the battle progressed, but the proportions remained
much the same.
Aircraft
Although the German bombers were the
Luftwaffe's main agents of destruction, the fighters were the most important,
because they could sweep away the RAF fighters to allow the bombers clear
passage. Similarly, the fighters in service with the RAF were the only weapons
that could stop the German bombers from ranging over the country.
The Luftwaffe's main fighter, the
Messerschmitt Bf- 109E, could reach a speed of 355 miles per hour and an
altitude of 36,000 feet, but it had an operating range of little more than 400
miles. This limitation meant that the Bf- 109E could spend a very small amount
of time over the target area if it was to have sufficient fuel to return to
base. The Luftwaffe also used the Messerschmitt Bf-110, a large twin-engine
aircraft that was designed to fly long distances but could also take on
defending fighters like its single-engine cousin, the Bf-109. However, the
Bf-110 was quickly found to be more of a liability than an asset when
confronted by the RAF's more nimble Spitfires and Hurricanes.
In defense of Great Britain, the RAF
employed two types of single-engine fighter, the Spitfire and the Hurricane, of
which the latter made up about three-fifths of the total. The Hurricane had a
top speed of 330 miles per hour and could reach altitudes of 34,000 feet. It
had a range of 500 miles and could absorb a great deal of battle damage while serving
as a good, steady gun platform. The Spitfire was a slightly younger aircraft
and benefited in its construction from slightly newer technology. It could
reach a speed of 360 miles per hour and an altitude of 32,000 feet and had a
range of 400 miles. Possessing great maneuverability, the Spitfire was armed
much like the Hurricane, with eight 0.303-inch machine guns. Although these
were perhaps outclassed by the armament of the Bf-109 and Bf-110, which carried
20-millimeter cannon, they were sufficient to shoot down Luftwaffe bombers. The
range of the British fighters was not as critical as that of the Bf-109,
because the Spitfires and Hurricanes had a critical advantage in the RAF's
advanced and efficient fighter control system.
Fighter
Control
The best fighter aircraft flown by the
finest pilots would have been to no avail if they had not known where their enemy
was. The RAF, however, relied upon a combination of radar to warn of enemy
formations approaching the coast, an observing organization to track the enemy
over land, a system of control rooms, each responsible for a certain area, with
radio communications between them, and the airborne pilots themselves to make
the most efficient use of its resources. In this way, the outnumbered Spitfires
and Hurricanes were able to intercept the incoming Luftwaffe directly, without
wasting their efforts in flying patrols simply looking for the enemy.
Convoys
The English Channel, one of the busiest
waterways in the world, in 1940 served innumerable convoys carrying materials
and supplies along the British coast. In early July, the Luftwaffe began
attacking these convoys to force the RAF into battle to protect them. Over the
next four weeks, the Spitfires and Hurricanes were in combat almost daily with
the Luftwaffe. After a month, losses were almost two to one in favor of the
RAF. However, the Luftwaffe's large superiority in numbers meant that it could
hold out longer than the RAF, which would eventually lose. Shipping in the
Channel was reduced, but never completely halted, in order to remove the
potential target from the Luftwaffe's sight.
Attack
of the Eagles
To some extent, the Luftwaffe's convoy
battles had been merely a means of distracting the RAF while the Luftwaffe
prepared and positioned its resources for the main battle. On August 13, called
Eagle day by the Germans, the main attacks started, beginning four weeks of
concentrated bombing designed to destroy the RAF and generally weaken the
country's ability to resist an invasion. Attacks on airfields, ports, and dockyards
by large formations of German aircraft set the scene for the next weeks and
betokened hard, intense fighting for both sides. At the end of the day, the
Luftwaffe had lost forty-six aircraft; the RAF had lost only thirteen fighters,
but many of the fighter squadrons' airfields and communications were damaged.
The Luftwaffe hit more and more airfields and also damaged several radar
stations but, apparently not realizing the importance of the radar system,
failed to follow up on these particular attacks.
The airfield damage, however, was soon felt
by the RAF squadrons, and a reduction in their fighting strength and efficiency
became apparent. It was clear that if the Germans continued to attack in this
fashion, they might achieve victory, an outcome which had not previously been
considered by the British. The RAF continued to shoot down German aircraft at a
greater rate than it lost its own aircraft and achieved notable success on some
occasions. German bombers based in Norway attacked northern England without a
fighter escort, on the assumption that all RAF fighters would have been drawn
south to the Channel coast. At a cost of fifteen bombers, the Germans
discovered they were wrong.
After another month, the Luftwaffe had lost
some 670 aircraft, and the RAF had lost about 400 fighters. Damage to British
airfields increased, whereas production of Spitfires and Hurricanes began to
fall behind their losses. Pilots also were being injured and killed faster than
the training system could replace them. It could be only a matter of time
before the RAF became exhausted.
Air
Raids on London
On September 7, the Luftwaffe changed
tactics, turning their bombers away from British airfields and factories and
heading for London. Nearly 1,000 German aircraft crossed the Channel and headed
for the capital, to be met by some 250 British fighters that struggled to break
through the fighter escort and attack the bombers. Many German bombers did get
through, however, and heavily bombed London's East End, starting many fires in the
docklands area. The RAF fighters had some success, shooting down thirty-six of
the German raiders, but they also lost twenty-six Spitfires and Hurricanes of
their own. Similar raids continued for another week, and the RAF used the time
to repair and strengthen itself while intercepting the Luftwaffe at every
opportunity. Then, on September 15, the Luftwaffe attacked with the largest
number of aircraft ever, more than 1,000 aircraft headed for London once more,
only to be intercepted and their formations broken up before they reached the
city. In the fighting, the RAF again lost twenty-six fighters, but the Germans
lost sixty aircraft. This date was the high point of the battle for the RAF and
has since been known as Battle of Britain Day. Two days later, Hitler postponed
the invasion of Britain indefinitely.
Later
Stages
The battle continued through the remainder
of September and most of October, as the Luftwaffe increasingly turned its
efforts toward night bombings. From time to time, it mounted large raids during
the day but mainly flew small, high-altitude raids, often with bomb-carrying
Bf-109's rather than bomber aircraft. These stood a much greater chance of
hitting their targets and flying away again without being shot down, but their
effect was minimal. Finally, at the end of October, the battle fizzled out as
autumn rain set in, but the people of Britain still had months of night bombing
to endure. The German effort to defeat the RAF, however, had failed.
As the air battle progressed, the Germans
prepared finally to invade Britain. As part of this effort, they had gathered
from the canals of Europe a vast number of barges in which to transport their
troops across the Channel. These barges, assembled in the Channel ports of
France, were quickly spotted by RAF bombers, who regularly attacked them,
causing considerable damage both to the barges themselves and to the port
facilities that would be needed to mount the invasion. The bombers were also
active against the Luftwaffe, attacking airfields from which the German
aircraft flew, often at considerable loss to themselves.
Losses
From the beginning of July to the end of
October, the two air forces had fought a massive battle, which neither had
anticipated and which only the RAF had been designed to fight. Although both
sides suffered severely, the Luftwaffe's losses were sufficient to make it
realize it could not achieve its objectives. The RAF was able to absorb its
losses and inflict upon the Germans their first defeat of the war.
The RAF lost 1,023 aircraft, including
aircraft destroyed in air raids, and 537 men. The Luftwaffe's losses were much
higher: 1,887 aircraft and 2,662 men. The differing ratios of aircraft to men
is accounted for by the fact that the RAF losses were almost exclusively
single-seat fighters, whereas the Luftwaffe losses included many bombers
carrying crews of four or five. Also, an RAF pilot who bailed out unhurt was
over his own country and might be back in the air the next day, whereas any
Luftwaffe airman who bailed out was inevitably taken prisoner.
Bibliography Bungay, Stephen. The Most Dangerous Enemy. London: Aurum Press,
2000. A modern history that examines new information together with a fresh
interpretation of old sources. Mason, Francis K. Battle Over Britain. London:
McWhirter Twins, 1969. Probably the best overall account of the battle to be
compressed into one book with a good background to developments in scientific
aids used. Overy, Richard. The Battle of Britain: The Myth and the Reality. New
York: W. W. Norton, 2001. A modern debunking of some of the popularly held
notions of the Battle of Britain and celebrating the very real accomplishments
of the RAF. Ramsey, Winston G., ed. The Battle of Britain: Then and Now.
London: Battle of Britain Prints International, 1989. A very detailed, day by
day diary of the battle showing losses for both sides with, in many cases,
photographs of the men concerned
